The news out of Afghanistan has been surprisingly fast and furious in recent weeks, as the NATO offensive in the southern Taliban stronghold of Marjah kicked into high gear. Late last week, as Afghans raised the flag of the new government in the center of town, it seemed that the worst of the fighting was over.
And yet – as Afghanistan history and culture has taught us – claiming “mission accomplished” would be premature, indeed. Instead, it’s smart to think of this as only the beginning. Why?
Getting Up Close and Personal with Afghans
One of the clearest illustrations I’ve ever read came from an Associated Press story last week by Alfred de Montesquiou – a writer who has obviously done his homework on Afghan tribal dynamics:
“U.S. Offensive Yet to Persuade Afghans in Key Town“
The story explains through the eyes of tribal leaders why they have good reason to fear a return of the Taliban. It correctly notes that Afghans don’t necessarily like the Taliban. However, given a choice between the stern Taliban and the corrupt prior Afghan police force, tribal leaders tend to lean toward the Taliban as the lesser of two evils.
Actually, that doesn’t surprise me. Parenting experts often note that humans will accept stern treatment much more easily than unfairness. But unfortunately for Afghans, Taliban sternness is ridiculously oppressive and extreme.
What Have we Won? Time Will Tell…
It seems clear that to win hearts and minds of Marjah’s civilians – and to maintain victory over the Taliban regime – Americans and NATO must remain in the area for a protracted period of time. The goal will need to focus not only on keeping the Taliban out, but also on monitoring Afghan police to ensure that past corrupt behavior does not return.
If justice can be bought-and-sold, and if influence and power go to the highest bidder, then the local Afghans will invite the Taliban back again.
It’s All in the Family
The heart of the issue speaks to the tribal nature of Afghans. The Taliban are not just outlaws – they are also kinsmen. They belong to clans and tribes – which are important to Afghanistan’s Pashtun people.
In fact, Afghan tribes who perpetually fight amongst themselves have been known to come together specifically for the sake of expelling a common enemy (for example an unwelcomed foreign army). Once the foreigners retreat, the Afghans may well resume their in-fighting.
This is precisely what happened when the Soviets were driven out of Afghanistan. The Taliban eventually seized control, but not without fierce battles. They essentially won a civil war, and have since imposed their will on weaker tribesmen.
The Power of Presence
So today, the antidote must be a continuing military presence by American and NATO forces. How long? As long as it takes – which may drag on for a few years.
However, if we leave too soon, we’ll create a power vacuum – which is likely to attract conflict and bloodshed, if recent Afghan history is any indicator.
Once we retake Taliban strongholds, we can’t allow them to fall back into Taliban hands. The Taliban are in collusion with al Qaeda – and al Qaeda is seeking to destroy as much of the western world as possible. While the financial cost of maintaining a force in Marjah may be high, the cost of leaving prematurely will certainly be higher.
I’m heartened to hear about the progress our troops are making on the frontlines. I hope we find a way to demonstrate a long-term commitment to the welfare of struggling Afghan tribes, who seem to be caught in the middle of forces beyond their control.
Jeff
P.S. To learn more about my experiences with Pashtun tribal leaders when I was deployed as a trainer in a remote Eastern province of Afghanistan, check out my book, “Afghan Journal: A Soldier’s Year in Afghanistan.” Read an excerpt and reviews at the “Afghan Journal” site, or buy the book at Amazon.com.










