Since the U.S. renewed its Afghanistan military strategy last December, many experts have weighed-in on our potential to “win” – and the best way to do so. Meanwhile, public support for a sustained military effort seems to continue waning, and our departure seems inevitable. But if so, when? And under what circumstances?
Photo credit: The Washington Post - Major Jim Gant in Afghanistan
Digging Deeper
As a Soldier who’s served in Afghanistan, my first instinct is to answer by asking several more critical questions…
To the first question, some would say we’ve basically achieved the mission. We’ve punished the Taliban for supporting al Qaeda, and we’ve disrupted its ability to harm citizens in our country and elsewhere.
But how well have we actually disrupted al Qaeda’s activities? Further, we’ve not yet prevailed at eliminating (or even significantly reducing) the very serious threat posed by Islamic extremists and terrorists. Therefore, I believe the mission is still incomplete.
The second question relates to the first. What do we intend to leave in place, and what’s the best way to achieve this? Both the means and the end are related. We should use tactics and strategies that achieve the desired goal. But if we haven’t clearly defined our goal, how can we determine if we’ve arrived?
Postcards from the Edge
Major Nathan Springer (Chief of Operations, U.S. Army & Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center) recently wrote an insightful essay about the military’s role in Afghanistan: “The Way Ahead – Is There a Silver Bullet?”
This commentary is actually Major Springer’s response to another paper, “Afghanistan – Winning, One Tribe at a Time,” by Major Jim Gant, U.S. Army Special Forces.
Common Themes
Although these military leaders differ on several points, they agree on several core concepts. First – they stress the importance of working directly with Afghan tribes – rather than focusing on support of the central Afghan government. Their premise is based on first-hand experience in Afghanistan, working on the front lines with tribal elders to defeat the Taliban.
Many of their thoughts and feelings echo my own. I, too, spent time in Afghanistan, training Border Police in a remote region near Pakistan. I was just one small part of the Army’s efforts to “advise, assist, train and lead” Afghans to defend themselves. But I get it.
The most important point on which we all agree is this – no matter how the U.S. defines success in Afghanistan, it will not occur without forging real, genuine, ongoing connections with the Afghan people. We’re on their turf. It’s a tribal culture. Therefore, to win hearts and minds, we must deeply involve ourselves with tribes. One fascinating 5-part video blog is devoted solely to raising awareness about this issue: “It’s the Tribes, Stupid.”
I also share both majors’ concern that if we exit Afghanistan too quickly, we’ll leave behind a power vacuum that will prompt tribal conflict – or worse, civil war. We have a responsibility to the Afghan people to leave them in relative safety and security. In fact, we’ve promised to support and protect them against Taliban retribution.
We started this. And we have a moral obligation to end it in a reasonably positive way.
Lessons From History
I recall when Ronald Regan took office as President. Afghanistan was embroiled in conflict with the Soviet Union, and America was providing the mujahideen with weapons to defeat the spread of communism. When the Soviets left Afghanistan, America left as well.
It seemed we had won, and the Afghans were moving on a positive trajectory towards self-determination and a strong, enduring relationship with the United States. And yet, only a few years later, the Taliban had seized power, and Osama bin Laden found it a safe hiding place.
Obviously, we had left too soon.
Let’s not make the same mistake twice.
Jeff
P.S. To learn more about my experiences with Pashtun tribal leaders when I was deployed as a trainer, check out my book, “Afghan Journal: A Soldier’s Year in Afghanistan.” Read an excerpt and reviews at the “Afghan Journal” site, or buy the book at Amazon.com.
